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INTRODUCTION
The reliance on hypothetical choices raises obvious questions regard-
ing the validity of the method and the generalizability of the results. 
By default, the method of hypothetical choices emerges as the simplest 
procedure by which a large number of theoretical questions can be in-
vestigated. The use of the method relies on the assumption that people 
often know how they would behave in actual situations of choice, and 
on the further assumption that the subjects have no special reason to 
disguise their true preferences. 
—Kahneman and Tversky [1979, 265]
Based on rational self-interest, many economists believe that only real ﬁ  nancial 
incentives will elicit true economic behavior from participants in economic experi-
ments. Thus, the use of hypothetical incentives is generally restricted to classroom 
examples (and even in this case, extra credit points or some other academic reward 
may be used). The idea that people will show their real preferences in response to 
hypothetical incentives is believed by many to be unrealistic. It is widely accepted that 
while hypothetical examples can help in explaining economic situations and gauging 
how people might react to a situation, they will not provide an exact replication of 
human economic behavior.
However, there is little actual experimental evidence to suggest that hypothetical 
incentives do not give similar results compared to ﬁ  nancial incentives in at least some 
economic experiments. Some experiments have been conducted using hypothetical 
incentives, relying on the assumption that people have no reason not to act in an eco-
nomically rational manner regardless of the type of incentive. For many experimental 492 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
situations there is little reason to believe that people will not act in such a manner, 
even if incentives are hypothetical. The use of ﬁ  nancial incentives is one of the few 
features that distinguishes economics experiments from those in other disciplines. 
As Camerer and Hogarth [1999, 7] point out:
Economists presume that experimental subjects do not work for free 
and work harder, more persistently, and more effectively, if they 
earn more money for better performance. Psychologists believe that 
intrinsic motivation is usually high enough to produce steady effort 
even in the absence of ﬁ  nancial rewards; and while more money might 
induce more effort, the effort does not always improve performance, 
especially if good performance requires subjects to induce spontane-
ously a principle of rational choice or judgment.
Given the high costs that are associated with conducting economic experiments, 
ﬁ  nding more cost effective methods has become a very important issue in experimental 
economics. Experimenters have adopted several methods of reducing the ﬁ  nancial cost 
of experimentation ranging from using hypothetical incentives to using random-pay 
methods to conducting experiments in foreign countries. Understanding the impact of 
hypothetical incentives on experimental outcomes is crucial. If experimental players 
behave in the same manner with hypothetical incentives as they do with real incen-
tives then not only can enormous amounts of money be saved, but a wider variety of 
experiments can be conducted.
This paper examines how subjects in the Ultimatum Game (UG) and Andreoni’s 
[1993] Public Goods Game (APGG) behave in response to hypothetical and real incen-
tives. The results from these two experiments are used to determine if economic games 
played with hypothetical incentives give accurate results. Several explanations exist 
as to why results may or may not be the same in different games; these are discussed 
in the conclusion.
The paper also uses the experimental results from these two games to further 
investigate how players make decisions in economic experiments. Economic theory 
usually points to self-interest as the main motivation in economic game play. How-
ever, in practice results do not always agree with this, thus we also look at how other 
aspects of behavior, such as fairness, complexity, competitiveness, and sequentiality 
and order, can affect game play. The signiﬁ  cance of each of these is also important in 
determining whether hypothetical and real incentives can give similar results. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: the next section reviews the literature 
and summarizes past experimental results from UG and APGG; the one following that 
presents the experimental design; then there is a section that describes the results, 
and ﬁ  nally a concluding section which suggests future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW
In order to increase the size and scope of their experiments, experimenters have 
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These methods have allowed economists not only to test a wider range of economic 
theories at a lower cost, but also to conduct experiments that may not be feasible 
under other conditions.
Bolle [1990] suggests a method of reducing experimentation costs in which experi-
menters simply pay a random player, or random set of players, from the game. In this 
situation, he suggests that at the end of the experiment, a subset of players, chosen at 
random, be paid.1 Thus, experimenters could both lower the overall costs of experiments 
and signiﬁ  cantly raise the stakes in experiments without signiﬁ  cantly raising costs.2 
Bolle provides theoretical and experimental evidence from UG that such a method 
works. Sefton [1992] provides evidence from the Dictator Game3 that suggests that 
Bolle’s approach may not always work, ﬁ  nding that subjects are more generous when 
paid for randomly selected rounds. Sefton suggests that the variation in these results 
may be caused by the type of game or by the size of the stakes in the game.
Other experimenters have conducted experiments in less developed countries in 
order to gain experimental evidence about “high-stakes” games at relatively low cost. 
Cameron [1999] conducted a UG experiment in Indonesia that allowed for stakes to 
be raised to three times the average monthly expenditures of the participants. Slonim 
and Roth [1998] conducted a similar experiment in the Slovak Republic, which al-
lowed the stakes to be raised to the equivalent of 62.5 hours of average wage. On 
the surface, the results from this approach are very effective for lowering costs and 
expanding the range of economic experiments. However, comparing results from such 
studies implies that ethnic and cultural backgrounds do not affect bargaining/economic 
behavior. Roth, et.al., [1991] investigate this very fact as they compare the results of 
UG and a market auction game across four different countries. They ﬁ  nd that there 
are some important differences in market behavior that may be attributed to cultural 
differences. Thus, relying on high stakes games from other countries alone provides 
insufﬁ  cient, or at least incomplete, results. 
Blumenschein, et. al. [1997] investigate how hypothetical and real payments differ 
in Vickrey auctions.4 They ﬁ  nd that bids in Vickrey auctions involving hypothetical 
payments are signiﬁ  cantly higher than bids in such auctions involving real payments. 
Blumenschein, et. al. conclude that there is a bias in any study that involves hypo-
thetical payments. However, they do not present reasons for why this bias exists, nor 
do they give justifying explanations as to why it should hold for hypothetical incen-
tives in all economic experiments. While the results found by Blumenschein, et. al. 
do suggest that hypothetical incentives may not work in economic experiments, they 
only consider one type of experiment. 
Kahneman and Tversky [1979] rely solely on hypothetical incentives in their 
study of risk aversion. They suggest that their study depends on the assumptions 
that people know how they will act in actual situations and that they have no reason 
to hide their true preferences. They further argue that since any economic study has 
some drawbacks, relying on hypothetical choices is not any more detrimental. The 
study by Kahneman and Tversky has since been challenged by Holt and Laury [2002], 
who ﬁ  nd that subjects become increasingly risk averse as payoffs increase with real 
incentives, whereas increasing the scale of hypothetical incentives has no effect on 
behavior. Harrison, et. al. [2005] and Holt and Laury [2005] conﬁ  rm this result even 
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Thaler [1986] addresses the issue of whether small incentives, relative to larger 
ones, are efﬁ  cient in economic games. Thaler argues that there is not enough evidence 
to show that raising stakes is more likely to elicit economic behavior. This further 
suggests that if higher stakes do not guarantee better game play, then real incentives 
may not be needed at all. 
Forsythe, et. al. [1994] take a different approach to economic theory in using hy-
pothetical incentives in economic experiments. Although the monetary signiﬁ  cance 
of hypothetical incentives is in itself very important, Forsythe, et. al. present the 
idea that hypothetical incentives can be used to further test what players base their 
game play on. They use hypothetical payments to both test whether players behave 
similarly in Ultimatum and Dictator games with hypothetical and real payoffs and to 
determine what role fairness plays in bargaining games. They determine that fairness 
is not as signiﬁ  cant a factor as many have previously thought. 
Although there have been several attempts to determine ways of lowering costs 
in economics experiments and to investigate how hypothetical incentives change a 
player’s game play, no solid conclusions have been drawn and even fewer reasons have 
been presented which explain observed outcomes. In this paper, we further investigate 
the relationship between hypothetical incentives and behavior in economics experi-
ments and present possible explanations for differences or anomalies in the results. 
The varying results found tend to support the aggregate inconclusiveness of previous 
studies about hypothetical incentives.
Andreoni’s Public Goods Game
APGG was ﬁ  rst used by Andreoni [1993] to test the public goods crowding out 
hypothesis, that is, involuntary contributions (taxes) will crowd out voluntary contribu-
tions to public goods. Andreoni uses a payoff matrix5 that involves “token” contributions 
to a group investment from three separate players. These contributions determine 
a player’s individual payoff. The three players in Andreoni’s Game are assigned to a 
random group, in which they do not know the identities or individual contributions 
of the other players in their group. The matrix reﬂ  ects a public good in that as one 
player’s contribution rises, the payoff for the other players rises. In Andreoni’s Game, 
the Nash equilibrium is for each subject to contribute three tokens and the Pareto 
efﬁ  cient outcome is for each subject to contribute six tokens.
APGG, in its original play, involves two stages. The ﬁ  rst is based on the original 
payoff matrix, where three players can contribute from 0 to 7 tokens. The second 
stage involves a mandatory contribution of at least 2 tokens, and then allows players 
to contribute anywhere from 0 to 5 additional tokens. The payoff matrix for this part 
is the same as the original payoff matrix, but with the ﬁ  rst two columns and four 
rows removed. This mandatory contribution plays the role of a tax towards the public 
good. In his original study, Andreoni ﬁ  nds that the average total contribution under 
the taxation situation is signiﬁ  cantly larger than the average contribution without 
the tax. Furthermore, Andreoni ﬁ  nds crowding out that is, although still incomplete, 
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For this paper, only the ﬁ  rst stage of Andreoni’s experiment will be compared 
with hypothetical and real incentives. Using real incentives, Andreoni reported an 
average contribution of 2.78 tokens for the ﬁ  rst stage. 
Ultimatum Game
The UG is a simple two-stage bargaining game involving a proposer and a re-
sponder. In the game, the proposer makes a decision to split some pot into an amount 
he wants to keep for himself and an amount he offers to the responder. The responder is 
then given the choice of accepting the offer or rejecting the offer, in which case neither 
player receives anything. Economic theory suggests that the proposer should always 
offer the minimum amount to the responder, since both players would be better off 
with anything than with nothing. However, historical evidence differs signiﬁ  cantly 
as splits typically follow a 60-40 average, and responders rarely are willing to accept 
any offer [Slonim and Roth, 1998; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Roth, et. al. 1991].
Experimenters generally believe that the decision made by the proposer is based 
on some combination of three factors: self-interest, fairness, and fear of rejection. 
Self-interest refers to a players concern only for maximizing his own payoff. A player 
concerned only with self-interest would choose to offer the Nash equilibrium of 0 to 
the second player.6 Fairness refers to a player wanting to make a fair offer to the 
responder. The ideal offer in this case is believed to be an equal 50-50 split between 
the two players. This means that if fairness is a factor in decision-making in the UG, 
then it has a negative effect on the Nash equilibrium point.7 The ﬁ  nal possible factor 
is the fear of rejection of an offer. This would also have a negative effect on the Nash 
equilibrium and, on its own, encourages a player to offer as much as possible to the 
responder.8 
Given the amount of evidence showing that players do not rationally play the 
game based on self-interest alone, it is generally assumed that a proposer in the UG 
makes his decision based on a combination of self-interest and fairness, or self-inter-
est and fear of rejection.9 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Four sessions were conducted as part of this experiment. All participants were 
students enrolled in principles of economics courses at Duquesne University or 
California University of Pennsylvania. In exchange for their participation, students 
received some pre-determined amount of extra-credit in their course. In each session 
participants played both the UG and APGG. Table 1 summarizes the order of play 
and incentive type for each session. All participants entered the sessions unaware 
that they may be paid for their participation. For this reason, the games with real 
incentives were always played second.10 
At the beginning of each experiment, subjects were told, either to “do their best” 
or that they would be paid, in cash, based on their participation at the end of the 
game. The UG was played with a $10 pot. Subjects were randomly assigned the role 
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offer from $0 to $10, down to the nearest nickel, to a randomly selected responder. Deci-
sion forms were collected by the experimenters and randomly assigned to responders. 
Responders were then asked to decide whether to accept the offer, with both players 
receiving their share of the split, or to reject the offer in which case both the proposer 
and the responder would receive nothing. After responders made their decisions, the 
forms were re-collected and re-distributed to the proposers. All participants played 
10 rounds (although they were unaware of how many rounds would be played). For 
the real incentive session, subjects were paid in cash for one randomly selected round 
at the end of the session.11 
 TABLE  1
  Games Played and Incentive Types, by Session
Session  First Game/Incentive Type  Second Game/Incentive Type
  1  APG Game Hypothetical  Ultimatum Game Real
  2  Ultimatum Game Hypothetical  APG Game Real
  3  APG Game Hypothetical  Ultimatum Game Hypothetical
  4  Ultimatum Game Hypothetical  APG Game Hypothetical
Subjects in APGG were asked to choose from 0 to 7 tokens to contribute to the 
group investment. After players denoted how many tokens they wished to contribute, 
decision forms were collected by the experimenters and randomly assigned to a group. 
Experimenters noted what group member each player was in and how many tokens the 
other group members contributed and returned the forms to the participants. Subjects 
then calculated their payoffs according to the payoff matrix and began making their 
decisions for the next round. For APGG subjects played a randomly selected number 
of rounds, between 6 and 10. For the real incentive session, subjects were paid in cash 
the sum of their earnings from all rounds of play (in cents).12 
DATA ANALYSIS
Ultimatum Game
Table 2 summarizes the results from the UG, by session. Data from Slonim and 
Roth’s [1998] low stakes session is included as an additional real incentive comparison. 
The upper half of the table presents ﬁ  rst round results, while the lower half summa-
rizes all rounds.13 Session 3 stands out as having higher offers; Session 4 has a much 
higher ﬁ  rst round acceptance rate. Comparing the ﬁ  rst round results to all rounds, 
there is a clear difference between the real and hypothetical incentive sessions. While 
the average amount offered remains relatively stable in the real incentive session, 
the average amount offered falls signiﬁ  cantly in each of the hypothetical sessions (an 
average of 7 percent). In all but Session 4, the mean acceptance rate rises after the 
ﬁ  rst round; however it generally rises less in the hypothetical sessions.
Figure 1 and Figure 2 present histograms of the offers made in the ﬁ  rst round 
and all rounds, respectively. Session 3 again seems to stand out, especially in the 
ﬁ  rst round. When examining all rounds, the distribution of offers in the real incentive 
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 TABLE  2
  Ultimatum Game Results Summary
  Ultimatum Game Results (ﬁ  rst round)
    Incentive                       Amount Offered                  Mean
Session Type  Observations  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Acceptance
  1  R  12  3.979 4.375 1.325 0.250
  2  H  12  3.358 4.00  2.033 0.250
  3  H  8  4.625 5.00  0.744 0.125
  4  H  10  3.300 3.75  2.091 0.700
  All  hypothetical  H  30  3.677 4.00  1.836 0.367
Slonim and Roth (1998) ‘low stakes’ session:
  Practice  Round  H  24  4.988 5.00  0.782 0.958
  First  Round R  24  4.538 4.50  0.487 0.875
  Ultimatum Game Results (all rounds)
    Incentive                       Amount Offered                  Mean
Session Type  Observations  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Acceptance
  1  R  120  3.998 4.00  1.153 0.783
  2  H  120  2.961 3.00  1.515 0.583
  3  H  80  4.091 4.00  0.996 0.500
  4  H  100  3.053 3.375 1.597 0.690
All  hypothetical  H  300  3.413 3.75  1.440 0.550
Slonim and Roth (1998) ‘low stakes’ session:
    R  240  4.450 4.70  0.693 0.825
 FIGURE  1
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 FIGURE  2



















































































The results of t-tests for the equality of means are presented in Table 3 for the 
ﬁ  rst round and for all rounds. The shaded cells indicate tests of the real versus hypo-
thetical incentive hypothesis. The t-tests indicate that there is no statistical difference 
between the ﬁ  rst round offers in our real incentive session and any of our hypothetical 
incentive sessions. However, the average offer in all rounds of Sessions 2 and 4 are 
statistically signiﬁ  cantly different from the average real incentive session offer at the 
1 percent level. Players in both of those sessions offered less than players in the real 
incentive session (they were playing closer to the Nash equilibrium). 
By aggregating the data across all rounds, these t  -tests assume that each decision 
in each round is an independent observation; this is clearly not the case as participants 
may be choosing strategies in which choices in later rounds are predicated on behavior 
observed in earlier rounds. In the extreme this might imply that each session is an 
independent observation; however, since our variable of interest does not vary within 
a session such a restriction is not practical. Here we apply the individual-speciﬁ  c ran-
dom effects model to perform our hypothesis tests. Table 4 presents these regression 
results. The same differences noted with the t-tests above can be seen here as well. The 499 HYPOTHETICAL VS. REAL INCENTIVES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
real incentive variable has a statistically signiﬁ  cant positive impact on amount offered 
when examining data from all rounds, but is insigniﬁ  cant in the ﬁ  rst round data.
 TABLE  3A
  Ultimatum Game: t-tests for Equality of Means, by Session (Offered) 
   1  2  3  4
Session   Real  Hypothetical  Hypothetical  Hypothetical
   Mean  3.979 (1st)  3.358 (1st)  4.625 (1st)  3.300 (1st)
      3.998 (all)  2.961 (all)  4.091 (all)  3.053 (all)
 1  3.979 (1st)   -0.621  -0.646  0.679
 Real  3.998  (all)    (-0.882) (-1.391)  (0.895)
 2  3.358 (1st) -1.037    -1.267 0.058
Hypothetical 2.961  (all)  (-5.969)***    (-1.970)* (0.066)
 3  4.625 (1st) 0.092  -1.130    1.325
Hypothetical 4.091  (all)  (0.602)  (-6.364)***    (1.877)*
 4  3.300 (1st) -0.945  -0.092  1.037
Hypothetical 3.053  (all)  (-4.941)***  (-0.436)  (5.329)*** 
Numbers in italics refer to ﬁ  rst round data. First round t-tests appear above the diagonal. Cells in the 
body of the table contain the difference between the means and related t-statistics (in parentheses). * = 
10% signiﬁ  cance level, ** = 5% signiﬁ  cance level, *** = 1% signiﬁ  cance level. Shaded cells present tests of 
the hypothetical pay hypothesis. All t-tests are based on unequal variances.
 TABLE  3B
  Ultimatum Game: t-tests for Equality of Means, by Incentive (Offered)
  Session                 Session 1 Real               
   Mean  3.998  (all)  3.979 (1st)
  2, 3,   3.677 (1st)   -0.303
 and  4      (-0.595)
 Hypothetical  3.293  (all)  -0.706 
     (-5.174)*** 
Numbers in italics refer to ﬁ  rst round data. First round t-tests appear above the diagonal. Cells in the body 
of the table contain the difference between the means and related t-statistics (in parentheses). * = 10% 
signiﬁ  cance level, ** = 5% signiﬁ  cance level, *** = 1% signiﬁ  cance level. All t-tests are based on unequal 
variances.
 TABLE  4
  Ultimatum Game: Random Effects Regression, 
  Dependent Variable Amount Offered
  All Rounds  First Round Only
Incentive (=1 if real)  0.7055  0.3025
 (1.97)**  (0.6)
Round -0.0126  —
 (-0.72) 
Constant 3.362  3.677
 -15.73***  -10.89***
R-squared 0.05  0.01
Observations 420  42
Cells in the body of the table present the coefﬁ  cient estimate and z-statistic (in parentheses). * = 10% 
signiﬁ  cance level, ** = 5% signiﬁ  cance level, *** = 1% signiﬁ  cance level
-0.621 -0.646 0.679
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Finally, random effects probit regressions are used to compare whether or not 
hypothetical versus real incentives affect acceptance rates in the UG.15 The results 
in Table 5 indicate that while amount offered has a statistically signiﬁ  cant impact on 
acceptance, the coefﬁ  cient on the incentive variable is insigniﬁ  cant.
 TABLE  5
  Ultimatum Game: Random Effects Probit Model, 
  Dependent Variable Accepted (=1 if Proposer’s offer is accepted)
  All Rounds  First Round Only
Incentive (=1 if real)  0.2072  -0.8593
 (0.71)  (-1.02)
Amount Offered  0.8364  1.043
 (7.59)***  (2.42)**
Round 0.003  --
 (0.11) 
Constant -2.405  -2.279
 (-5.95)***  (-2.08)**
Log Likelihood  -193.2  -8.834
Observations 420  42
Cells in the body of the table present the coefﬁ  cient estimate and z-statistic (in parentheses). * = 10% 
signiﬁ  cance level, ** = 5% signiﬁ  cance level, *** = 1% signiﬁ  cance level.
Generally speaking, the results from the Ultimatum game are inconclusive. Ses-
sions 2 and 4 had similar mean offers, but very different acceptance rates. Sessions 
1 (real) and 3 also had similar means (but different from the other two sessions), but 
the acceptance rate in Session 1 was higher. While generally results from all rounds 
indicate a difference between the results of the real and hypothetical sessions, results 
from the ﬁ  rst round of play do not indicate such a difference.
Andreoni’s Public Goods Game
Table 6 presents summary statistics for the APGG by session. Data from Andreoni 
[1993] is provided as an additional real incentive comparison. The upper half of the 
table presents ﬁ  rst round results, while the lower half summarizes all rounds. Session 
3 again stands out; the average contribution and payoff were higher in the ﬁ  rst and 
all rounds. Beyond this, there appears to be no differences between sessions.
Figures 3 and 4 present histograms of the number of tokens contributed in each 
session for APGG for the ﬁ  rst and all rounds, respectively. Overall, these distributions 
appear very similar.16 Comparing the ﬁ  rst round results to all rounds, it appears that 
the amount contributed decreases more in the hypothetical sessions than in the real 
incentive session. 
The results of t-tests for the equality of means for the number of tokens contributed 
in APGG are presented in Table 7 for the ﬁ  rst round and for all rounds. The shaded 
cells indicate tests of the real versus hypothetical incentive hypothesis. The t-tests 
indicate that there is no statistical difference between the offers in our real incentive 
session and those seen in Sessions 1 or 4 (ﬁ  rst round and all rounds); however, we 
ﬁ  nd a signiﬁ  cant difference between the real session and Session 3. Players in that 
session offered slightly more than the Nash equilibrium 3 tokens, while players in 
the other sessions offered slightly less.501 HYPOTHETICAL VS. REAL INCENTIVES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
 TABLE  6
  Andreoni’s Public Goods Game Results Summary
Andreoni’s Public Goods Game Results (ﬁ  rst round)
   Incentive                       Amount Contributed           Mean
Session Type  Observations  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Payoff
 1  H  23  2.913  3.00  1.703  57.783
 2  R  23  2.695  2.00  1.550  55.304
 3  H  16  3.563  3.00  1.672  76.500
 4  H  18  2.889  3.00  1.231  58.444
All hypothetical  H  57  3.088  3.00  1.562  63.246
Andreoni (1993)
First  Round  R  18  2.83 3.00 1.150  62.333
(collected 1989)
First  Round  R  18  2.94 3.00 1.552  60.778
(collected 1990)
Andreoni’s Public Goods Game Results (all rounds)
   Incentive                       Amount Contributed           Mean
Session Type  Observations  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  Payoff
 1  H  184  2.745  2.50  2.063  55.832
 2  R  138  2.645  3.00  1.894  53.283
 3  H  160  3.206  3.00  2.089  67.744
 4  H  126  2.730  3.00  1.536  54.595
All hypothetical  H  470  2.898  3.00  1.954  59.325
Andreoni (1993)
   R  720  2.788  3.00  1.561  57.829
 FIGURE  3
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 FIGURE  4
  Histograms of Amount Contributed in Andreoni’s Public Goods Game (all rounds)


























































































 TABLE  7A
  Andreoni’s Public Goods Game: t-tests for Equality of Means, 
  by Session (Amount Contributed)
   1  2  3  4
Session  Hypothetical  Real  Hypothetical  Hypothetical
   Mean  2.913 (1st)  2.696 (1st)  3.562 (1st)  2.889 (1st)
      2.744 (all)  2.645 (all)  3.201 (all)  2.730 (all)
 1  2.913 (1st)   -0.217 -0.649  0.241
Hypothetical 2.744  (all)    (-0.453) (-1.184)  (0.053)
 2  2.696 (1st) -0.099    -1.267 -0.193
Real 2.645  (all)  (-0.450)    (-1.970) (-0.445)
 3  3.562 (1st) -0.462  -0.561    0.674
Hypothetical 3.201  (all)  (-2.056)**  (-2.432)**    (1.324)
 4  2.889 (1st) 0.014  -0.085  0.476 
Hypothetical 2.730  (all)  (0.070)  (-0.403)  (2.220)**
Numbers in italics refer to ﬁ  rst round data. First round t-tests appear above the diagonal. Cells in the 
body of the table contain the difference between the means and related t-statistics (in parentheses). * = 
10% signiﬁ  cance level, ** = 5% signiﬁ  cance level, *** = 1% signiﬁ  cance level. Shaded cells present tests of 
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 TABLE  7B
  Andreoni’s Public Goods Game: t-tests for Equality of Means, 
  by Incentive (Amount Contributed)
  Session                 Session 2 Real               
   Mean  2.645  (all)  2.695 (1st)
 
 1,  3,  3.088 (1st)    0.392
 and  4      (1.022)
 Hypothetical  2.899  (all)  0.253 
     (1.369) 
Numbers in italics refer to ﬁ  rst round data. First round t-tests appear above the diagonal. Cells in the body 
of the table contain the difference between the means and related t-statistics (in parentheses). * = 10% 
signiﬁ  cance level, ** = 5% signiﬁ  cance level, *** = 1% signiﬁ  cance level. All t-tests are based on unequal 
variances.
 TABLE  8
  Andreoni’s Public Goods Game: Random Effects Regression, 
  Dependent Variable Amount Contributed
 All  Rounds








Cells in the body of the table present the coefﬁ  cient estimate and z-statistic (in parentheses). * = 10% 
signiﬁ  cance level, ** = 5% signiﬁ  cance level, *** = 1% signiﬁ  cance level.
Table 8 presents the results of a random effects regression with amount con-
tributed as the dependent variable. The results indicate that after controlling for 
round, session, and player, the incentive type has no statistically signiﬁ  cant impact 
on contribution.17
CONCLUSION
Our experimental tests of the hypothetical pay hypothesis indicate mixed results. 
Some results from the UG show that players do not play the same way in games in-
volving hypothetical incentives as they do in games involving real incentives. Players 
in hypothetical sessions tended to offer less, that is, they played closer to the Nash 
equilibrium. This effect was not seen in the ﬁ  rst round of play, where subjects’ offers 
were statistically indistinguishable, but became more apparent in successive rounds 
of play. However, in APGG it appears that players generally respond the same way 
to hypothetical incentives as they do to real incentives (only one of our hypothetical 
sessions appeared statistically signiﬁ  cantly different from the real session). These 
results are not signiﬁ  cantly different from results found in other studies that focus 
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can be played without paying substantial payoffs. While it does seem irrational to 
say that participants in economic experiments will always perform similarly with 
hypothetical and real incentives when asked, it is not that unrealistic to say that 
in some economic experiments, players will play with the same strategy. While the 
reasons for the differences are unclear, there are some possible explanations which 
can be drawn by looking at the differences in the two types of games.
First, there is a complexity factor to consider. Andreoni’s game is undoubtedly 
more complicated to learn and play with a consistent strategy than the UG. Thus, a 
player may ﬁ  gure that if he is going to learn how to play APGG, they might as well 
play their best. Correspondingly, a game that is complex to learn may have a higher 
level of competitiveness, which could certainly be a driving factor in economic games. 
Thus, in APGG, players may be driven by an incentive to just “win” by getting a big 
payoff. Given the relative simplicity of the UG, playing for hypothetical incentives may 
appear to be rather mundane to participants, especially when the game is continued 
for ten consecutive rounds. There also does not appear to be as much of an incentive 
or drive to “win” in the UG. Thus, the amount of effort a player puts into an economic 
game may directly be reﬂ  ected by how much they consider it to be a “game” in the 
traditional sense.
Another possibility has to do with the simultaneous play of the Andreoni game. 
Since players are making decisions at the same time, there is no rejection factor and 
no punishment factor in the Andreoni game. Thus players do not have to gauge their 
decisions according to possible responses of an unknown player, like the UG. In the 
UG, there is still a rejection and punishment factor in the hypothetical sessions. The 
only difference is that the rejection or punishment is no longer real, thus, players 
should be less concerned with being rejected. 
The ﬁ  nal and most signiﬁ  cant aspect that should be considered is the idea of fair-
ness in economic games. If it is concluded that using hypothetical incentives eliminates 
the self-interest aspect from the UG,18 then either a fairness factor or fear of rejection 
factor should become the dominant strategy. If fairness is indeed an important factor 
in determining offers in the UG, then when real incentives are removed, there should 
be an expected decrease in the average offer. Since there is less of a self-interest fac-
tor, fairness should motivate players to move towards an equal split. However, the 
evidence presented here suggests that, if anything, removing real incentives causes 
the average offer to decrease, thus fear of rejection seems to be the more dominant 
factor. If there is no real money to be won, there is less of a concern of being rejected.19 
Similarly, if player 2 rejects unequal offers because they are not fair, then she would 
have less incentive to do this if the payoffs are hypothetical; however, our data sug-
gests that offers are more likely to be accepted under real incentives after controlling 
for the amount offered.
The study presented here provides some preliminary evidence that hypothetical 
incentives in some economic experiments give accurate results. Further development of 
this idea could include several possibilities. First, to control for the possible “complex-
ity” factor, a simpler version of a simultaneous type of game, such as the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, could be played with hypothetical and real incentives. Additionally, to fur-
ther investigate fairness and competitiveness in experiments such as these, players 
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The evidence presented here suggests that in some economic experiments simply 
requesting that subjects behave in a manner they would if incentives were real may 
provide accurate results. Additional effort should be addressed at determining the 
factors that lead to situations in which hypothetical and real incentives are equivalent. 
With this knowledge, both the number of experiments that can be conducted, and the 
number of observations that can be recorded, could increase signiﬁ  cantly.
 APPENDICES
Instructions for Andreoni’s Public Goods Game. Italicized items in brackets 
were inserted for the appropriate sessions.
  Contribution Decision Game Instructions
On each of your direction sheets there is a number in the upper left-hand corner. 
This number denotes your player number. This will be your number for both experi-
ments. It is imperative that you do not reveal this number to any other participant. 
(This paragraph was the ﬁ  rst paragraph in the instructions for the ﬁ  rst game in every 
session, regardless of which game was being played.)
The ﬁ  rst [second] game that we will play involves dividing all the participants into 
randomly assigned groups of three. You will NOT know who the other members are 
in your group, and the group assignments will change each round. Please note that 
only the experimenters will know who the other two members in your group are.
Your group makes up what will be called a contribution group. The members 
of your group will each make individual contributions to a Group Investment. Your 
payoff from these contributions will depend on how much you invest and how much 
the other two members of your group invest.
It is your task to decide how many tokens you would like to put into the group 
investment. For each round, you can contribute any number of tokens you choose from 
0 to 7. (Remember: the other two members of your randomly assigned group will be 
making similar decisions while you are making yours.) 
If you would now turn over the next page, you will see the Payoff Matrix that 
will determine what your payoff will be (in cents) based on your contribution and the 
other group members contributions. You will not actually receive this payoff, but we 
ask that you play the game as if you were going to. [Please note that in this game you 
will receive this actual payoff amount. At the end of the game we will total your payoffs 
from each round and pay this total (again, in cents).] (Note that all members follow the 
exact same Payoff Matrix.) In each round you will use a contribution decision form to 
ﬁ  ll out the number of tokens you wish to contribute to the Group Investment. Please 
do not make any other markings on this form. The forms will then be collected by the 
experimenters, and each form will be randomly assigned to a group. The experiment-
ers will then denote on the form what group number you were assigned for that round 
(this will change each round) and what the total contribution was by the other two 
members of the group. The contribution decision forms will then be returned to the 
players, at which point you should use the payoff matrix to determine what your payoff 506 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
for that round was, and mark it on the contribution decision form. The game will then 
continue for a pre-determined number of rounds known only to the experimenters. 
If you will now turn over the next sheet on your desk you will ﬁ  nd the record sheet 
for the ﬁ  rst [second] game. After each round, please use this record sheet to ﬁ  ll out 
what group number you were in, what you contributed, what the total amount the 
other members of your group contributed, and what your payoff was, in the respec-
tive columns. 
We will now provide an example to demonstrate how the Payoff Matrix works. 
Suppose that you decide to invest 2 tokens in the Group Investment. Also, suppose 
that one other player invests 4 and another player invests 6. Thus, your contribution 
is 2 and the total amount contributed by the other two members is 4+6=10. So, using 
the Payoff Matrix, going down the column marked 2 and across the row marked 10, 
your payoff would be 140. Similarly, the player who contributed 4 receives a payoff 
of 86 (4 down, 2+6=8 across), and the player who contributed 6 receives a payoff of 
47 (6 down, 2+4=6 across). 
Contribution Decision Form (Form used for Andreoni’s Public Goods Game).
 
  Contribution Decision Form
Player______ Round_____
Remember: You can contribute anywhere from 0 to 7 tokens. Your payoff will be 
determined by the Payoff Matrix.
Please circle the number of tokens you would like to contribute in this round:
0              1              2              3              4              5              6              7
My Payoff was_____
(To be ﬁ  lled out by experimenter)
Group Number_____
Other Players’ Total Contributions_____507 HYPOTHETICAL VS. REAL INCENTIVES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Payoff Matrix for Andreoni’s Public Goods Game.
 Your  Contribution
     0 1  2 3 4 5 6  7
   0 0 1  3 6 9  10  11  10
   1  1  4  8 11 14 15 15  14
   2  5  9  14 18 20 21 20  17
   3 12 17  22 26 28 28 25  22
 Total  4 21 28  33 36 37 35 32  27
 Amount  5 34 40  45 48 47 44 39  32
 Contributed  6 49 56  60 61 59 54 47  38
 by  Other  7 68 74  77 76 72 64 55  44
 Two Group   8 90 95  96 93 86 76 64  51
 Members    9 115 118  117 111 102  89  74  58
   10 143 144  140 131 119 103  85  66
   11 175 173  166 153 137 118  97  75
   12 210 205  193 177 157 134 109  84
   13 248 239  223 203 178 151 122  93
   14 290 276  256 230 201 169 136  103
Instructions for the Ultimatum Game. Italicized items in brackets were 
inserted for the appropriate sessions.
  Proposition Decision Game Instructions
If you do not remember your player number it is again located in the upper left-
hand corner of these instruction sheets. Once again, please do not reveal this number 
to any other participant. (This paragraph was the ﬁ  rst paragraph in the instructions 
for the second game in every session, regardless of which type of game was being 
played.)
Based on your seating decision, you have been pre-assigned to be either a proposer 
or responder for the ﬁ  rst [second] game that we will play. In this game, each proposer 
will decide how to divide up ten dollars between himself and a randomly matched 
responder. The randomly assigned responder will then be given the choice to accept 
the proposal, with each player receiving the amount that was proposed, or reject the 
proposal, with each player receiving nothing. The proposer can divide up the ten dol-
lars however he chooses, down to the nearest nickel. 
Please note that you will not actually be paid the amounts determined in this 
game, but we ask that you play the game as if you were. Remember if the offer is re-
jected by the responder, both the proposer and the responder receive nothing. [At the 
end of this second game, one round will be randomly selected by a drawing. For this 
randomly selected round you will be paid the actual amount of cash that you received 
from that round. Remember if the offer is rejected by the responder, both the proposer 
and the responder will receive nothing for the randomly selected round.]
Each round will begin with the proposers deciding how they want to divide the 
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what you have decided to keep and what you have decided to offer. The experimenters 
will then collect the forms and randomly distribute them to the responders. Respond-
ers are then asked to ﬁ  ll out their player number and circle whether or not they have 
decided to accept the offer. If you will turn over the next page on your desk you will ﬁ  nd 
a record sheet for the second game. If you are a responder, please ﬁ  ll out each round 
after you have made your decision. If you are a proposer, please ﬁ  ll out each round 
after the forms have been returned to you by one of the experimenters. The game will 
be repeated for a pre-determined number of rounds. Please note that although the 
responder will know the player number of the proposer, and the proposer will know 
the player number of the responder after the response, nothing will be known about 
the identity of either player. 
Proposition Decision Form (Form used for the Ultimatum Game). 
  Proposition Decision Form
Proposer: Player_____  Round_____
Remember: You can divide $10.00 any way you choose, down to the nearest nickel. 
The amount you keep and the responder gets must add up to $10.00. If the responder 
accepts, the money will be split as suggested, if the responder rejects, both players 
will receive nothing.
Please denote the amount that you wish to keep for yourself and the amount that you 
propose giving to the responder:
I Keep__________
Responder Gets___________
(To be ﬁ  lled out by the responder)
Responder: Player______
Responder Accepts? (Please Circle YES or NO)
YES / NO509 HYPOTHETICAL VS. REAL INCENTIVES: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
 NOTES
  The authors thank Carol Kraker Stockman and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft.
1.  Note that a similar approach is used in this study in respect to UG, as only one randomly selected 
round is paid.
2.  Bolle acknowledges that this method would not work for every type of economic game. He especially 
points out that games with high decision costs or ethical incentives are more likely to reduce a player’s 
willingness to play if pay is going to be random. However, for simple games, such as UG, the method 
appears to have merit.
3.  The Dictator Game is a variation of UG where whatever split is made by the proposer cannot be 
rejected by the responder.
4.  Vickrey auctions are auctions that have the highest bidder pay the second highest bid. These auctions 
are believed to reveal a player’s true willingness to pay.
5. See  Appendix  Payoff Matrix for Andreoni’s Public Goods Game.
6.  Based on the idea that a responder would receive 0 accepting or rejecting. In practice, this number is 
actually the minimal amount that a proposer can offer.
7.  Fairness can also be interchanged with charity, the idea that the more the proposer offers, the better 
he feels. In theory, a person playing only based on this idea would offer the entire pot to the responder, 
which has been seen in practice. Regardless of the classiﬁ  cation, fairness or charity, there is a negative 
effect on the Nash equilibrium.
8.  The only guarantee of knowing exactly what your payoff will be without any risk of rejection is to offer 
everything.
9.  The idea that a player would be concerned with fairness and fear of rejection seems to be unrealistic. 
If a proposer were playing “fair,” the idea of being concerned with being rejected is an anomaly. 
10.  It was believed that asking participants to play a game with hypothetical incentives followed by one 
with real incentives would suffer from unwanted order effects.
11.  For a detailed view of the instructions and forms for the Ultimatum Game see Appendices. 
12.  For a detailed view of instructions, forms, and the payoff matrix for Andreoni’s game, see Appendi-
ces.
13.  Recognizing that since subjects were randomly matched, each subject might affect the others, so that 
individual data may not be independent observations, we examine ﬁ  rst round data from each session 
in addition to all of the data collected. 
14.  This is further conﬁ  rmed by the results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney tests which reject 
the hypothesis the equality of the distributions of offers between the real and hypothetical incentive 
sessions, when examining all rounds. When looking only at ﬁ  rst round offers, you cannot reject the 
null hypothesis for these tests.
15.  If it is accepted that offers are different given the different type of incentives, a means test compar-
ing acceptance rates across sessions would be inaccurate, since acceptance is clearly affected by the 
amount offered.
16.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Mann-Whitney test conﬁ  rm the statistical equality of the distribu-
tions.
17.  At the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we conducted a simple Monte Carlo experiment to de-
termine the statistical power of these hypothesis tests. Data was generated for simulated ‘real’ and 
‘hypothetical’ sessions with the same variances as our actual data but different means. In order to 
consistently (greater than 95 percent of the time) reject the null hypothesis in RE regressions using 
this simulated data, the difference in the mean contribution needed to be greater than 0.6, while in 
our actual data the observed difference was 0.253. This implies that there may be insufﬁ  cient experi-
mental data to resolve a difference that may well exist.
18.  A more likely conclusion is that it simply scales self-interest down.
19.  It is unclear if this would actually cause a decrease in offers, however if players are still playing with 
any self-interest or level of competitiveness, it would be expected that offers should decrease.510 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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